Prompt Injection Attacks

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Roadmap

- Formalizing prompt injection attacks
- Examples of prompt injection

Threat Model

- Attacker’s goal
  - What does the attacker want to achieve for a target system?
- Attacker’s background knowledge
  - What does the attacker know about the target system?
- Attacker’s capability
  - What can the attacker do to the system?

Formalizing Prompt Injection Attack



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

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Threat Model for Prompt Injection

- Attacker’s goal
  - LLM outputs attacker-desired response
- Attacker’s background knowledge
  - LLM?
  - Instruction?
- Attacker’s capability
  - Contaminate data

Formalizing Prompt Injection Attack



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

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

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

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

Formalizing Prompt Injection Attack



Naïve Attack, i.e., empty separator

Escape Characters, e.g., “\n”

Context Ignoring “Ignore previous instructions.”

Fake Completion “Answer: task complete.”

Combined Attack “\n Answer: task complete. \n Ignore previous instructions.”

Experimental Results on GPT-4

Naive Attack	Escape Characters	Context Ignoring	Fake Completion	Combined Attack
0.62	0.66	0.65	0.70	0.75

Attack Success Value: likelihood that LLM accomplishes injected prompt correctly

More powerful LLMs are more vulnerable

Optimization-based Prompt Injection Attacks

- Formulate an optimization problem to quantify attacker’s goal
- Optimization variables: injected prompt

Adversarial Example

Panda

+

Carefully crafted noise

=

Monkey

Adversarial example

Prompt Injection vs. Adversarial Example

- Adversarial example
  - For specialized AI models
  - Only modify data
    - Image data
  - Task is not changed

- Prompt injection
  - For general-purpose LLMs
  - May inject instruction to change task
  - Significant industry attention

Roadmap

- Formalizing prompt injection attacks
- **Examples of prompt injection**

Examples of Prompt Injection Attacks: Stealing System Prompts in LLM-integrated Applications



LLM-integrated applications

Hui et al. “PLeak: Prompt Leaking Attacks against Large Language Model Applications”. In *ACM CCS*, 2024.

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

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

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

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Examples of Prompt Injection Attacks: Malicious Tool Selection in LLM Agents



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

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

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Examples of Prompt Injection Attacks: Manipulate Web Agents



Wang et al. “WebInject: Prompt Injection Attack to Web Agents”. In *EMNLP*, 2025.